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What is meant by the term "people's war"? 
The concept can be defined both narrowly 
and broadly. Defined narrowly, the term is 
used to denote the body of strategic thought 
on "protracted war" developed by Mao Ze-
dong in the 1930s and 1940s, during the pe-
riod of the Chinese Civil War and the 
struggle against the Japanese. This definition 
is firmly rooted in the larger Marxist-Leninist 
theory of class struggle. Defined broadly, the 
concept of people's war is used generically 
to denote any form of guerrilla conflict or 
popular insurrection, regardless of its ideo-
logical roots. By this definition, the opening 
and middle stages of the Chinese Commu-
nist struggle against the Nationalist (Kuom-
intang) regime was an example of a people's 
war, as was the Afghan campaign against the 
Marxist regime in Kabul. 
The definition of people's war used in this 
entry takes a middle course. The term, on the 
one hand, will be used to describe a body of 
ideas on population-based conflict or insur-
gency that goes beyond the specific concept 
of operations developed by Mao. At the 
same time, we will retain the ideological 
meaning of the term by referring to those 
forms of "popular warfare" based on the 
concept of class struggle. Defining the con-
cept in this manner distinguishes it, on the 
one hand, from the type of conflict waged in 
Afghanistan, which would represent a more 
generalized form of guerrilla warfare, as well 
as from the type of class-based revolutionary 
conflict envisioned by Lenin, which was 
based primarily on political rather than mil-
itary forms of struggle. While the last act of 
revolutionary takeover, in Lenin's view, 
would be carried out by a popular' insurrec-: 
tion, the months and years leading up to the 
insurrection would be characterized by,'care': 
ful, behind-the-scenes political, work" de-
signed to place the revolutionary party in a 
position to catalyze a final uprising and seize 
power when the historical momenL:' was 
deemed to be propitious. It would, not' be 
characterized by a period of revolutionary 
war, per se, in which the outcome of the 
struggle would be decided by a military in.:. 
teraction. , " 
Although the concept of people's war,' for 
definitional purposes, can be usefully distin-
guished from the larger concept of guerrilla 
warfare, we should not lose sight of the'fact 
that the first is merely an ideological sub~t 
of the second. The defining operational prob-
lem, in each case, is the same: overcoming 
the conventional military superiority of the 
state (or occupying power) through an asym-
metrical campaign based on the support (and 
resources) of a constituent population. While 
the leadership of a people's war will attempt 
to draw support from among a revolutionary 
class (classically, the peasantry), the non-
Marxist insurgency will define its natural 
constituency along different lines (e.g., eth-
nicity, communal affiliation, or regional 
identity). Where the first defines its popular 
base "horizontally" (according to class) 
across national or ethnic lines, the second de-
fines its base of support "vertically" (accord-
ing to some other group identifier) without 
regard to its class affiliation: ,\ 
The underlying organizational tasks facing 
the leadership of a people's war are similar 
to those faced by that of any insurgency. We 
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can define these as (1) penetration, which 
speaks to the revolutionary organization's 
need to "get inside" targeted social groupings 
as a prelude to "turning" them to the service 
of the organization's political and military ob-
jectives, (2) transformation, which speaks to 
the insurgency's need to consolidate its con-
trol over the targeted group and redirect 
some percentage of its resources to the orga-
nization's goals, and (3) application, which re-
fers to the ways in which these resources are 
used to further develop an insurgent infra-
structure, undermine the competing infra-
structure of the state, and, ultimately, extend 
the insurgent's zone of control. Collectively, 
these tasks define the process of social mobi-
lization. Every insurgent organization must 
address each of these operational tasks if it is 
to pose a viable challenge to the state. The 
manner in which it does so will define its the-
ory of victory. 
Revolutions and people's wars in the 
twentieth century have virtually all imitated 
or tried to imitate earlier revolutions. These 
successful cases of the past establish opera-
tional models that are adopted by latter-day 
revolutionaries who hope to repeat the suc-
cess of those that preceded them by replicat-
ing their experience. While such cases have 
generally addressed the question of "why" 
one should revolt, as well as what revolu-
tionary changes should be carried out in so-
ciety at such time as one actually wins, the 
principal influence has been over how an 
armed revolt should be prosecuted in the 
first place. For those who come to the prob-
lem of overthrowing a standing regime with 
high ambition but little practical experience, 
a revolutionary paradigm offers an immedi-
ate (if often stylized) recipe for action. 
The tradition of people's war, for its part, 
has been dominated by two original para-
digms: the model of protracted conflict de-
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veloped by Mao and the foco concept of 
guerrilla warfare developed by Ernesto 
"Che" Guevara. Most revolutionary insur-
gencies since the end of World War II have 
sought to either directly apply or adapt and 
refine one or the other of these baseline con-
cepts of operation to local circumstances. 
Each of these models can be usefully defined 
in contrast to the other. The concept of pro-
tracted conflict developed by Mao is de-
signed to be prosecuted by a "low-profile" 
organization carrying out a "bottom-up" ap-
proach to insurgency. By contrast, it can be 
said that the theory of insurgency developed 
by Che Guevara is designed to be prosecuted 
by a "high-profile" organization from the 
"top down." In certain key respects, these 
two models represent operational opposites. 
In doing so, they bound the larger concept 
of people's war. 
The Chinese Model of People's War 
Mao's assessment of the operational problem 
facing the Chinese Communist Party during 
its early struggles in the 1920s and 1930s 
rested on two essential considerations that 
bear on the general study of people's war. 
The first of these was his assessment of the 
standing government's overwhelming mate-
rial advantage over the Communist party. 
The second was the government's equally 
apparent political weakness. Deposing the 
old regime, in Mao's view, would require the 
party to overcome its material weaknesses by 
exploiting the opportunities provided by its 
comparative political advantage. As Mao ob-
served at the time, "All guerrilla units start 
from nothing and grow." At the outset of 
this type of struggle, the standing regime 
represents a force in being. The guerrilla, by 
contrast, represents a force in development. 
The latter begins with little more than an 
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idea. The guerrilla's one opening under these 
circumstances, according to the theory of 
class conflict, is provided by the inherent 
frailty of the regime's political base and the 
corresponding weakness of its institutional 
presence throughout the countryside. Ex-
ploiting this opening, Mao argued, will per-
mit a guerrilla force to bridge the gap 
between its grand ends and limited means 
over the course of the struggle. 
Time, Space, and Initiative 
The strategy designed by Mao to square the 
circle between ends and means rested on the 
calculated use of time and space. Buying 
time, Mao argued, was essential if the re-
gime's strengths were to be turned into 
weaknesses and the guerrilla weaknesses 
were to be turned into strengths. The strug-
gle, in its most abstract form, was envisioned 
to be an institutional contest between the de-
veloping architecture of the "new state" on 
the one hand and the declining institutions 
of the "old state" on the other. Building the 
new and dismantling the old, Mao recog-
nized, would be a protracted undertaking. 
As this process unfolds, however, the rela-
tive balance between the guerrilla and the 
government would gradually shift. This 
shift, furthermore, could be expected to take 
on a dynamic quality over time. Guerrilla 
successes, he argued, would tend to be self-
reinforcing, just as the regime's growing rec-
ord of failure would tend to lead to the 
further erosion of the state and its adminis-
trative organs. While this process would ebb 
and flow, over the long run the decline of the 
state could be expected to accelerate, even-
tually at an increasing rate. The guerrillas' 
principal operational challenge, in this view, 
was not to end the war quickly, but to keep 
it going. 
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Unlimited time, in this strategy, required 
unlimited space. Space, in Mao's view, 
would provide the guerrillas with the room 
for maneuvers to buy the time necessary to: 
win. All space, in this sense, is not created 
equal. For practical purposes, a distinction 
was made between territory that, in the 
opening stages of the engagement, was-un":, 
der the effective control of the regime,and 
that which was not. If the guerrillas' evalu-
ation of the political environment facing each:. 
side was accurate, the regime' s administr~-, 
tive control throughout the countryside 
would be imperfect. To survive their weak 
beginning, the guerrillas would open the 
struggle in those areas of the country. in 
which the regime was weak and avoid mak-
ing a stand in those areas of comparative re-
gime strength. In pursuing such a strategy, 
the insurgency would give itself the best op-
portunity to gain the time it requiredtoes-
tablish an institutional counterweight to. the 
state. Revolutionary organization, in turn, 
would further extend the guerrillas' ability to 
establish effective spatial control. 
These ideas formed the basis of Mao's con-
cept of protracted war. According to this for-
mula, the war will evolve via the:, dual, 
mechanisms of II destruction and construc.,. 
tion"-through the step-by-step destruction 
of the state and the associated construction· 
of the new counterstate. The two, in Mao's 
view, are mutually dependent and must pro-
ceed in tandem. The erosion of the govern-
ment's administrative architecture at the 
margin of its control will open additional op-
portunities for the insurgents to expand their 
own institutional presence, just as the orga-
nization's earlier (if still limited) institutional 
base provided the springboard to open its 
campaign against the state in the first place. 
This can be expected to take on an iterative 
quality over time, as each new advance by 
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the guerrillas lays the groundwork for the 
next. The speed with which this campaign 
unfolds will be regulated by the strength of 
the state (which will tend to increase as the 
opposition pushes forward from the periph-
ery to the state's center of gravity), the nature 
of the government's counter-strategy, the 
level of local resistance to the guerrillas' ef-
forts to establish their own institutional pres-
ence, and the natural time limits associated 
with building an alternative set of political 
and military forms. 
Expressed in geographical terms, this pro-
gression is intended to slowly result in an 
extension of guerrilla authority from periph-
eral areas of the countryside (or political 
margin), where state control will be compar-
atively weak, toward the cities (or political 
center) of the country where the position of 
the regime is traditionally much stronger. 
This process can be described as one of pro-
tracted encirclement, in which the urban 
regions of the country are encircled and 
eventually detached from the interior. The 
dynamic quality of this strategy is manifest 
in several ways. First, it calls for the guerril-
las to push into areas of marginal control, 
even as they are being pulled into these areas 
by the political vacuum created by the retreat 
of the state. Second, as the opposition gains 
ground, it will naturally acquire the means 
to gain strength by gradually expanding its 
base of popular support. The inverse process, 
meanwhile, is occurring with the state, 
which is losing ground in a zero-sum contest 
for territorial control with the guerrillas. The 
result, in theory, is a compound shift in the 
relative balance of advantage as the guerril-
las become absolutely stronger and the re-
gime grows absolutely weaker at a more or 
less equivalent rate. 
The nature of this encirclement strategy is 
somewhat different from that which typi-
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cally characterizes Western military thought. 
For Mao, encirclement is not achieved by 
means of development, but through a pro-
cess of "strategic convergence." Encirclement 
in the first sense, as one commentator noted 
some years ago, refers to a process of "ec-
centric maneuver," in which the attacking 
force advances from a single point to sur-
round and strike at the enemy's flanks. In the 
Maoist system, by contrast, encirclement has 
taken on a more subtle cast. It is not a single 
action, but a complex "concentric maneuver" 
in which semi-autonomous forces converge 
on their target from multiple points in a pro-
tracted series of coordinated moves. Such an 
approach, if successful, will complicate the 
task facing the regime, which will be forced 
to counteract the guerrillas on multiple 
fronts, while simplifying the task facing the 
insurgents, who will be able to reduce their 
profile (and hence their vulnerability) to the 
enemy by not placing all of their eggs in a 
single (easily targeted) basket. 
The Evolution of the Armed Struggle 
A centerpiece of this strategy is the devel-
opment of a series of rural bases from which 
the insurgents will attempt to extend their 
areas of control. "Political mobilization," 
Mao observed, is a fundamental condition 
for winning the war. Mobilization, in turn, 
will only be translated into effective insur-
gent support if it results in the creation of a 
network of strategic areas that are able to 
service the guerrillas' material needs. The 
base area, in this sense, provides a "protec-
tive shell" that provides the guerrillas with 
the opportunity "to organize, equip, and 
train." It is formed by bringing a large num-
ber of points of influence together under a 
common administrative center. This process 
is achieved by establishing a local military 
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advantage, displacing (or neutralizing) the 
residual presence of the old regime, and cre-
ating an alternative set of governing and ad-
ministrative institutions. This progression, 
once again, is a dynamic one. According to 
Abimael Guzman, one of Mao's recent imi-
tators, "Base development, the [concomitant] 
development of [a] popular guerrilla army, 
and the resulting extension of the people's 
war [can be expected to take on a] momen-
tum of their own, leading to the greater un-
folding of the revolutionary situation." One 
thing leads to the next. 
In developing this view, Mao clearly dis-
tinguished between "guerrilla bases" and 
"guerrilla zones." The guerrilla base, as we 
have suggested, is a region that has already 
been incorporated into the emerging insur-
gent regime. While Mao acknowledged that 
there could be different types of bases, de-
pending upon their location and relative vul-
nerability to government attack, each 
represents a guerrilla "stronghold." Such 
strongholds can be distinguished from guer-
rilla zones, which Mao defined as areas in 
which the insurgents were able to operate 
with relative freedom, but where the state 
still retained a meaningful political and mil-
itary presence. The guerrilla zone, in this 
sense, is considered to be an area of transi-
tion (contested ground). The final conquest 
of the zone, according to Mao, will be 
achieved by using the established basing sys-
tem as a springboard to converge on any re-
maining state presence within the target 
area. Bases, in this view, effectively "encir-
cle" guerrilla zones, which, once captured, 
will be absorbed into an expanded base area. 
The revolution, in Mao's concept, will un-
fold in a series of stages, moving from the 
"strategic defensive," through a period of 
"strategic equilibrium," on to the "strategic 
offensive." The initial defensive stage of the 
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conflict can be characterized as a period 'of. 
"preparation." The insurgents' overridi1!g 
objective during this phase is to establish a 
secure political base in 'the interior fronj. 
which they can subsequently branch out and 
expand their range of operations\This is~'a 
period of high vulnerability. Like a' water 
course, the guerrillas must find .'their own 
level. Decisive battles, head-on engagements~ 
and areas of regime strength must all' be 
avoided as the opposition gradually .1~Ys 
down its roots. This view"was summariz'ed 
nicely by Mao in his argument that the "first 
principle of war is to pre'serve oneself, and 
destroy the enemy." The insurgents' primary 
concern during the defensive stage .'ofthe 
struggle, in this view, must be onp~eserving 
their core organization, from which the 
means to destroy the enemy will 'eventually 
develop. By the end of this period, much of 
the countryside will have been transformed 
into a political checkerboard. While the .re-
gime will still enjoy effective control at the 
center, large areas of" the countryside will 
have been brought under guerrilla influence. 
The second stage of the conflict; strategic 
equilibrium, will be reached when the insur-
gents feel they have achieved "equivalence'~ 
with the incumbent regime.' Mao referred to 
this stage as a period of ','stalemate." If the in-
itial defensive struggle can be described as a 
period of preparation, this phase of the .war 
can be characterized as one of "consolida-
tion." While the overriding concern during 
phase one was to establish~n initial series of 
base areas, the primary ,operati~nalobjective 
in stage two will be to geographically connect 
these bases in an effort toconsolidate and fur-
ther extend the guerrillas" zone of control. 
Over time, the regime'~ ~emainingpositions 
of influence in the interi'or'are to be restricted, 
, ' 
isolated, and gradually, disconnected from the 
center. The checkerb{)ard or "jigsaw" pattern 
" 
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of influence that characterized the end of 
phase one will evolve into an increasingly 
continuous pattern of guerrilla control by the 
end of phase two. By the end of this period, 
the regime will find itself forced into a defen-
sive posture, preoccupied with hanging on to 
what it has and decreasingly able to move of-
fensively against the guerrillas. 
In Maoist parlance, the final phase of a 
people's war is the period of "annihilation." 
It might also be thought of as a period of 
"exploitation," in which the institutional 
groundwork laid during the preparatory and 
consolidative phases of the struggle are 
brought to fruition. The guerrillas will enter 
this stage poised to transition to the strategic 
offensive. The early pattern of territorial dis-
persion that flagged the opening weakness of 
the guerrillas will have been transformed 
over time into a pattern of territorial control 
in which the insurgents will have sur-
rounded all but the most important points of 
regime influence. This development, in 
Mao's view, should be matched by a reor-
ganization of significant elements of the 
guerrilla "army," which can now be gradu-
ally reformed into units capable of carrying 
out fluid but increasingly conventional op-
erations. Guerrilla warfare, according to 
Mao, is not a strategy of choice but of neces-
sity, imposed by the initial material weak-
ness of the opposition. Once the balance of 
advantage in the conflict has swung to the 
opposition, the guerrillas are in a position to 
come out of the shadows and confront the 
regime on its own terms. 
The Cuban Model of People's War 
The Cuban model of people's war, codified 
by Che Guevara, was based on a highly styl-
ized (and often inaccurate) interpretation of 
the Cuban insurrection (1956-1959). The 
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baseline document outlining the key features 
of this model was written by Che Guevara 
and published by the Cuban Ministry of the 
Armed Forces in 1960 under the title Guer-
rilla Warfare. It was Che Guevara's first and 
most influential book. Guevara opened the 
monograph with the following observation: 
"The victory of the Cuban people over the 
Batista dictatorship ... showed plainly the 
capacity of the people to free themselves by 
means of guerrilla warfare from a govern-
ment that oppresses them." Three "funda-
mental lessons," he argued, could be drawn 
from this experience: First, that "popular 
forces can win a war against the army"; sec-
ond, that "it is not necessary to wait until all 
conditions for making [a] revolution exist, 
the insurrection can create them"; and, third, 
that "in underdeveloped America the coun-
tryside is the basic area of fighting." The 
model of action that emerged from these 
"lessons" would shape or otherwise influ-
ence revolutionary efforts over the next 
thirty years. 
Guevara's concept of operations was de-
veloped without reference to Mao's earlier 
writings on protracted war or a close under-
standing of the experiences of the Chinese 
Revolution. Guevara and Fidel Castro both 
claimed to have only been introduced to 
Mao's work in 1958, after the key features of 
the Cuban insurrection were already well de-
fined. In their view and the view of others, 
this proved to be fortuitous, freeing them 
from the temptation to apply revolutionary 
lessons from a time and place that may have 
little to do with the particular challenges 
(and opportunities) faced by the Cuban guer-
rillas. The "university of experience," in 
Guevara's view, was a more useful instructor 
"than a million volumes of books." This per-
spective was echoed by Regis Debray, one of 
the chief interpreters of the Cuban insurrec-
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tion, who suggested that it was a "stroke of 
good fortune that Fidel had not read the 
writings of Mao Zedong before disembark-
ing on the coast of Oriente: he could thus 
invent, on the spot and out of his own ex-
perience, principles of a military doctrine in 
conformity with the terrain." 
Where Mao's concept of protracted conflict 
may have been an appropriate model for the 
Far East, the new doctrine of people's war 
that emerged from the experience of the Cu-
ban insurrection, it was argued, was the 
model of choice for the unique circumstances 
found in Latin America. "Revolutionaries in 
Latin America," Debray observed, were 
"reading Fidel's speeches and Che Guevara's 
writings with eyes that have already read 
Mao on the anti-Japanese war, Giap, and cer-
tain texts of Lenin-and they think they rec-
ognize the latter in the former." This, he 
argued, was both a distorted and dangerous 
"superimposition." The popular struggle in 
Latin America, according to Debray, pos-
sessed "highly special and profoundly dis-
tinct conditions of development, which 
[could] only be discovered through a partic-
ular experience." Prior "theoretical works on 
people's war," accordingly, could "do as 
much harm as good." While such writings, 
he suggested, "have been called the gram-
mar books of the war, ... a foreign language 
is learned faster in a country where it is spo-
ken than at home studying a language man-
ual." The Cuban experience, in short, was 
believed to offer a new paradigm for action. 
The Foco 
The central instrument in Guevara's theory 
was the guerrilla foco. The foco or guerrilla 
band, in Guevara's view, was the nucleus of 
the insurrection. It would be comprised of a 
handful of dedicated men who would "jump 
start" the campaign to overthrow the st,and-
ing government through the power of ex~ 
ample. Over time, Guevara envisioned, the 
foco would naturally begin to attract recruits. 
As this occurred it would slowly grow until 
it reached some maximum (optimal)" size, 
which Guevara defined as somewhere be-
tween thirty and fifty men. At this point, it 
would split in two, each foco working inde-
pendently of the other to attract a follo,wing 
in different regions of the coulltry.Over 
time, as this budding process continued, the 
number of operational guerrilla bands would 
grow until the insurgents would~vent~ally 
become a force to be reckoned with '. in the 
countryside. In Guevara's view this process 
was similar to that of a beehive "wheri'at a 
given moment it releases a new queen, who 
goes to another region with a part' of; the 
swarm." The "mother hive," in, this 'case, 
"with the most notable guerrilla chief will 
stay in the less dangerous places~ while the 
new columns will penetrate other enemy ter-
ritory [and repeat the earlier] cycle." 
Guevara's concept of operations,-. to ,be 
sure, shared certain features with the theory 
of protracted war formulated by ,Mao. First 
and foremost was the assump~ion that, the 
guerrillas' natural base of support would be 
found among the peasantry. It followed, in 
turn, that the natural locus of the insurgency 
should also be in the countrY'side.While 
Guevara, at least in theory, did,' not com-
pletely dismiss the supporting role that 
could be played by an urban underground, 
he clearly relegated the struggle in the cities 
to a subordinate position. The insurrection 
would turn on the rural guerrilla. Those 
who, "following dogma," still believed that 
a revolutionary action could only be' carried 
out by urban workers, underrated, in his 
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view, both the revolutionary sentiment of the 
peasantry on the one hand and the difficul-
ties associated with operating in an urban 
environment on the other. "Illegal workers' 
movements," Guevara argued, faced "enor-
mous dangers" (which were not similarly 
faced by their rural counterparts) because of 
their greater proximity to the regime's center 
of influence. To offset this greater risk, "They 
must function secretly without arms." The 
rural guerrilla, by contrast, is able to operate 
"beyond the reach of the oppressive forces," 
and is thus able to sidestep the state's open-
ing advantage. 
Like Mao, Guevara also believed that the 
insurgent struggle would evolve in stages. 
The first stage of the conflict was the "no-
madic" phase, in which the initial guerrilla 
nucleus must continually remain on the 
move in order to survive. As the foco's re-
lationship with the peasantry began to sta-
bilize, the guerrillas would move into the 
second, "semi-nomadic" phase, in which the 
guerrillas, while still retaining a high level of 
fluidity, would be able to establish the first 
permanent base areas. The final phase of the 
conflict, Guevara argued, was the stage of 
"suburban guerrilla warfare." In language 
reminiscent of Mao, Guevara wrote that this 
stage would finally enable the guerrillas to 
"encircle fortified bases," engage in "mass 
action," and confront the army in open battle 
and win. "The enemy will fall," he sug-
gested, when "the process of partial victories 
becomes transformed into final victories, that 
is to say, when the [army] is brought to ac-
cept t~e battle in conditions imposed by the 
guernlla band; there he is annihilated and 
his surrender compelled." This, in turn, 
would ultimately result in an uprising of 
P?pular sentiment against the standing re-
gIme, sweeping it from power. 
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The Heroic Guerrilla 
While Guevara's writings on people's war 
share certain similarities to those of Mao, the 
strategic theory that underlies this work is, 
in the end, quite distinct. First, in contrast to 
Mao, Guevara gave primacy to what he re-
ferred to as the "subjective" rather than "ob-
jective" conditions for victory. A successful 
insurrection, in this view, did not require 
that the peasantry be already primed to re-" 
volt; the conditions for revolution could of-
ten be engineered by the guerrilla band. 
While Guevara gave at least passing refer-
ence to the necessary preconditions for rev-
olution in his initial discussion of the 
problem in Guerrilla Warfare, this caveat was 
increasingly relaxed over time. Guerrilla con-
flicts, he argued in a later article, could be 
successfully prosecuted throughout Latin 
America. Once set in motion, the revolution 
would "make itself." While the "initial con-
ditions" did not exist everywhere in the or-
thodox sense of the term, the desire for 
revolutionary change lay just below the sur-
face of the popular consciousness. It was 
only necessary to define, release, and finally 
channel these sentiments. 
In contrast to Mao, Guevara's theory of 
victory ultimately relied heavily on the spon-
taneity of the insurgent's natural allies to 
provide the guerrilla foco with the critical 
mass it required to win. Guevara assumed , 
~mplici:ly, that Latin-American society was 
m an Inherently unstable equilibrium. The 
task facing the guerrilla nucleus was to ag-
gravate the tension that he believed defined 
every Latin-American society, kick out the 
props that held up the old regime, and stand 
back while the target government was over-
come in a popular uprising. Once set in mo-
tion, the guerrillas would not so much 
control this event as ride it into power. What 
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was required under these circumstances was 
not a grassroots, step-by-step program of lo-
cal contact, indoctrination, and organization, 
but an action-oriented program designed to 
capture the popular imagination and inspire 
the peasantry "from above." The foco's op-
erational challenge, in this respect, was to 
sharpen and accelerate the natural process of 
social polarization, raise the peasants' politi-
cal consciousness, and embolden them to 
join the revolution. 
While the Chinese model of people's war 
considered political organization to be a nec-
essary precondition for social mobilization, 
the Cuban model argued that a high-profile 
"guerrilla outbreak" could be used to effec-
tively bypass the organizational requirement 
and proceed directly to mobilization. The ba-
sis of the insurgency, in the first case, rests 
with the vitality of the guerrillas' interlock-
ing, village-based associations. Collectively, 
these represent an institutional counter-
weight to the state and the foundation of the 
insurgency's political and military position. 
The basis of the insurgency, in the second 
case, rests squarely on the shoulders of the 
guerrilla combatant, and through him, the 
guerrilla foco. Success or failure in this case 
depends on the power of their example. The 
guerrilla, for his part, must be a "fighter-
teacher," who "need know little more than 
what is required of a good man or soldier." 
The guerrilla foco, for its part, must be an 
"armed nucleus," able to employ its limited 
resources to move its would-be followers to 
action. Creating this effect would not depend 
on organization, but on courage, discipline, 
and a willingness to act. 
As this discussion suggests, the Cuban 
model placed great importance on the psy-
chological dimensions of a guerrilla conflict. 
The guerrilla combatant, we are told, must 
never lose faith. He must "see reasons for a 
favorable decision even in moments when 
the analysis of the adverse and favorable, 
conditions does not show an appreciable 
positive balance." It is particularly important 
to continually generate the impression of im-· 
pending victory. This can be achieved" ini-
tially in small ways that have big effect~. A 
small guerrilla force caneflhance its off~n­
sive punch, for example, by "striking like a 
tornado" to "sow panic" within the enemy's 
ranks. The cumulative effects of small viCto-
ries won in such a fashion can, in turn, have 
higher-order effects on the general morale 
(and, hence, effectiveness) of the regime's 
military and political base,' imbuing ~hem 
with a sense of imminent doom. As these 
perceptions begin to take hold, the "obj~~tiye 
conditions" of the conflid'will gradual~y;be­
gin to shift to the insurgents' advantage, 
making it increasingly easy to 8ustait: this 
momentum over time. The guerrillas. will 
win when the enemy has .~inally come to .be-
lieve that their own defeat is inevitable.! 
The theory of guerrilla \,varfare advan~~d 
by Che Guevara, in the end, had an uneven 
relationship to the underlyulg clynamics 'of 
the Cuban insurrection. Many aspects of; the 
Cuban experience that' pr~ved to ·be critiCal 
to the ultimate success 6(the July 26 revo-
lutionary movement were=eitherleft out. or 
significantly downplayed. in' Guevara's con-
cept of operations. Several ofthese should be 
noted here. First and foremost~ perhaps,was 
Guevara's increasingly 'unrealistic view . of 
the "revolutionary readi~~ss/~" of ;'Latin.;. 
American society. As note~ above, Guevara 
gave little attention to the Earticular precon-
ditions that must exist to bring even the best-
laid plan to seize power ini,apopular 
insurgency to fruition .. Revolution for, Che 
Guevara could effectively:be created out of 
whole cloth. What was 6f critical importance 
was not the particular ,state of society, or 
j'i"H'tf't"t'V¢'tr"' M'zt'tWtMWM'rnrfJttw',,'tt $' 1m 1;- PHUD rr 51"Sfrnrn"" J 
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even the competing institutional strength of 
the opposition, but the courage, fortitude, 
and determination of the guerrilla fighter. 
Winning, in his view, boiled down to an act 
of will. Weak, pre-existing objective condi-
tions could be offset by the individual guer-
rilla's grim refusal to accept defeat. 
Second, in focusing on the rural guerrilla, 
Guevara ignored the decisive role played by 
the urban underground during the Cuban in-
surrection. The latter provided significant as-
sistance to Fidel's rural operations. During 
the early days of the war, in particular, sup-
port from the July 26 movement's pre-
existing urban networks was critical to the 
very survival of the rural foco. Throughout 
the course of the war, the actions of the ur-
ban underground-often carried out in a co-
ordinated and simultaneous manner across 
the country-served as a major source of dis-
traction, providing the guerrillas with the 
breathing space they required to stay in the 
game. The army was continually faced with 
the need to divide its efforts between the 
countryside and the cities, which made it dif-
ficult to concentrate on finding, fixing, and 
finally destroying Fidel's small group of ru-
ral combatants. In these and other ways, the 
cities proved to be a key variable in the out-
come of the war. Despite this fact, the role of 
the urban underground was effectively dis-
missed in Guevara's writings in favor of his 
naturally heroic country cousin. 
Finally, as much as Guevara appreciated 
the inherently dynamic, interactive nature of 
warfare, in attempting to generalize from the 
Cuban experience he imposed a post facto 
order and associated determinism on the 
course of the Cuban insurrection that it did 
not possess. Under the best of circumstances, 
combat is an uncertain process. There is often 
a high level of uncertainty surrounding the 
thousands of individual events that might 
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make up a battle, and the hundreds of battles 
that might make up a war, which will often 
prove to be decisive in determining who is 
left standing at the end of the day. This was 
certainly the case in the Cuban insurrection, 
where except for happy chance, the guerril-
las could have been defeated on any number 
of occasions during the course of the strug-
gle. As the Duke of Wellington said of the 
Battle of Waterloo, "it was a close run thing." 
And yet, the problematic character of the 
conflict (and guerrilla warfare in general) is 
missing in Guevara's interpretive mode. The 
inherent uncertainty surrounding the prob-
lem of revolutionary action, in this case, is 
effectively replaced by a discussion of the 
guerrilla's fighting spirit. The guerrilla, in 
Guevara's view, will dominate events be-
cause of his superior determination. 
The limits of this last assumption were 
demonstrated once and for all in Guevara's 
final action in Bolivia (1966-1967), where he 
was captured and killed attempting to put 
his theory into practice, one last time. The 
dramatic nature of his defeat proved to be 
the death knell for his model of guerrilla 
warfare. While the heroic quality of his death 
served to inspire those who came after him, 
subsequent guerrilla operations in Latin 
America would be defined by their efforts to 
correct the weaknesses inherent in his vol-
untarist theory of people's war. 
Summary: Two Models of 
Guerrilla Warfare 
The Chinese and Cuban models of people's 
war represent competing views of the struc-
ture and dynamics of guerrilla warfare. 
While both theories acknowledge that the 
underlying basis of revolutionary change ul-
timately rests on· long-run historical forces, 
the operational guidance given to revolution-
R 
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ary hopefuls attempting to tap into and har-
ness these forces, in each case, is distinct. For 
the Maoist, this is ultimately a problem of 
organization. Organization, in this sense, 
means building a grassroots, village-based 
alternative to the state. It follows that the 
chief measure of performance-which in this 
case is provided not by the scope or intensity 
of one's military actions, but the scope, 
depth, and vitality of one's organizational 
forms. The guerrilla's ability to pose a politi-
cal and military challenge to the state is be-
lieved to be a by-product of his slowly 
developing institutional base. There is noth-
ing "willful," in this view, about revolution-
ary outcomes. Strength of character and a 
pure heart are not considered to be effective 
substitutes for building an institutional coun-
terweight to the state. 
The opposite point of view, in many re-
spects, defines the Cuban model of insur-
gency. Guerrilla actions, in this theory, are 
not a manifestation of popular support, but 
the source of such support in the first place. 
The target population, in this respect, is not 
"organized" but "impressed." Popular mo-
bilization is less an iterative process than a 
catalytic event, in which the insurgents' nat-
ural constituency, spurred by the dramatic 
character of guerrilla actions, discovers its 
revolutionary identity and joins the rebellion. 
This shift, as noted, is expected to occur with 
little or no organizational investment by the 
insurgents. It will occur not as a result of a 
prior shift in local control, but in the wake 
of a general change in the sentiment of the 
revolutionary class. The guerrillas' primary 
task, then, is not institutional but psycholog-
ical. Their goal is to capture the popular 
imagination in the expectation of generating 
a popular uprising against the state. Will, 
rather than numbers, can be expected to 
carry the day. 
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These two models of people's war, then, 
can be defined by a simple dichotomy. The 
Chinese model represents a bottom-up, low-
profile approach to guerrilla conflict. For the 
low-profile challenger, insurgency is consid-
ered to be an institutional contest.,The'con-
flict will be pursued by undermining" the 
institutional architecture of the state andre-
placing it with the guerrillas' own in~,tltu­
tional alternative. Popular support, is 
mobilized at the grassroots level (from the' 
bottom up) in a staged process of organiza-
tion building. The Cuban model, by contrast, 
can be defined as a top-down, high-profile 
approach to insurgency. For the high-profile 
challenger, a guerrilla conflict will not be 
prosecuted by undermining the state's insti-
tutional forms, but by attacking its percep-
tual foundations. The regime~ill 'not pe 
slowly dismantled and replaced, but effec-
tively taken by storm (from the top down) in 
a psychological convergence of popular sen-
timent away from the old regime and in 
favor of the opposition. The guerrilla's op-
erational challenge is, first, to pro~ide the 
spark that sets the conflict in motion and, 
second, to serve as a conduit to channel the 
population's revolutionary sentiments. 
Gordon H. McCormick 
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